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1 On October 28th, 2016, The London employment tribunal recognized Uber’s drivers as
workers entitled to a national minimum wage (NMW) and other limited benefits the
global  tension.  This  unprecedented  verdict1 represented  a  game  changer  for  the
drivers’  struggle against  their  controversial  classification as partners/entrepreneurs
which is being skeptically viewed as ‘evasive entrepreneurship’ (Elert N. & Henrekson
M., 2014). Accordingly, the class action lawsuit that was initiated by two Uber drivers
from London, with the support of GMB, a UK general workers’ union, is paving the road
to the emergence of a labour jurisprudence on one of the greyest labor zones of the
contemporary work transformations. 
2 It is believed that such adjudgment will affect the work conditions and lives of up to
thirty thousand drivers in the UK, as officially declared by Uber in court, and hundreds
of thousands elsewhere in the world. More recently, an increasing number of workers,
contracted by similar applications based companies,  initiated litigation processes to
challenge the bogus of self-employment as imposed by enterprises operating within the
spectrum of the ‘gig-economy2’. In such context, ‘CitySprint,’ a UK based courier and
logistics  network,  lost  a  class  lawsuit3 in  January  2017.  Meanwhile,  the  London
employment  tribunal  asked  ‘Excell’,  one  of  CitySprint’s  affiliated  organizations,  to
recompense  one  of  its’  riders  for  holiday’s  payment,  in  March  2017.  Similarly,
‘Deliveroo,’ another British online food delivery company, is going to be investigated,
in May 2017, by the central arbitration committee to determine the employment status
of  their  couriers.  This  judicialization  is  also  on  the  rise  in  the  U.S.  where  several
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(around fifty) lawsuits in U.S. federal courts were filed against Uber in addition to other
litigation processes in several European countries (Gesley, 2016). 
3 This  commentary  is  committed  to  provide  a  critical  review  of  the  unprecedented
verdict in the case of Aaslam Y. & Farrar J. against Uber, dated October 28, 2016. Firstly,
it questions the ability of the judicialization process to address the conflictual relation
between  Uber  and  their  drivers.  Secondly,  it  underlines  the  shortfalls  of  the
adjudgment in capturing the mutations within work relations as imposed by Uber’s
mode  of  production.  Finally,  our  commentary  undertakes  a  critical  review  of  the
worker’s status as reasoned throughout the verdict.
 
1. The Limits of the Judicialization Option
4 Workers’  trust  in  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of  the  state  apparatus  is
increasingly deteriorating. This is observed by the fact that they increasingly perceive
judicial courts as the main venue to redefine the rightfulness and fairness of sanctioned
legislation or to fill in the legal loopholes. This growing judicialization of work-related
conflicts  pushes us  to  enquire  on the role  of  courts  and their  abilities  to  alter  the
structural inequalities and power relations. Siri Gloppen (2006) argues that such a role
should be questioned through a fourfold examination; 
Victims’  voice (a)  which assesses  the  effective  and efficient  accessibility  of  marginalized
groups and individuals into the judiciary system. 
The  willingness  of  the  judiciary  apparatus  to  acknowledge  the  raised  concerns – courts’
responsiveness (b) to undertake legal measures that challenge the power balance and judges’
capabilities (c) to boost social transformations.
The level of compliance (d) the judicial order garners from the political apparatus in each
statehood.
5 In the case of  Uber drivers,  this  examination is  essential  as  the accessibility of  the
judiciary system is a key challenge. In several cities, while the Uber is operating in a
legal  vacuum,  drivers  are  more  likely  to  be  challenged  by  a  hostile  trade  union
environment and/or existing taxi associations. In such context, financing the litigation
process remains a major challenge faced by these drivers. This pushes us to question
the affordability of such option for Uber drivers, especially when it is not nurtured by
operating trade unions. Even when access to the judiciary system is achieved, drivers
may be challenged by the inability of judges to interpret the transformations imported
by these applications based companies. This is explicitly observed within the different
litigation processes which involved Uber; in August 2015, a Barcelona judge referred a
lawsuit  against  Uber  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  for  their  orientation.
Recently, in May 2017, the ECJ ruled that Uber should follow national transportation
laws and acquire all necessary licenses4. Furthermore, while a California judge rejected
a settlement of 100 million USD between Uber and drivers, he was unable to clearly
reason an employment relation between both parties5. Finally, the nature and structure
of  power  relations  between  the  different  branches  of  the  state  apparatus  and  the
adherence to the separation of power which drastically differs across countries/cities
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2. Uber Drivers as ‘Workers’
6 The verdict issued by London’s employment tribunal detailed Uber’s business cycle; the
functioning and the payment modalities (paras 15–27), the type of contractual relations
with both passengers and drivers (paras 28–57) and Uber’s regulatory system (paras 58–
66). Accordingly, and based on ‘workers’ legislation’ and precedents (paras 70–82); the
judge reasoned that  the claimants  (Uber’s  drivers)  were ‘employed’  as  ‘workers’  by
‘Uber  London  Ltd’.  Hence,  the  drivers’  employment  status  was  defined  through  a
contractual  relation  with  no  room  for  an  ‘overarching  umbrella  contract’ (para 85).
Therefore,  the  drivers  were  recognized  as  ‘workers’  only  if  they  are  satisfying  the
following conditions; (a) Uber app is ‘switched on’ (b) drivers are operating within an
authorized territory and (c) ‘able and willing to accept assignments’ (para 86). 
7 As  per  the  official  classifications  of  employment  status  in  the  United  Kingdom,  a
‘worker’ does not usually enjoy any kind of protection against unfair dismissal or the
right to a minimum period of notice before being dismissed6. Similarly, they are not
entitled to request flexible working hours nor time off for emergencies which might be,
in the case of Uber, the right to decline a trip without being negatively affected or
penalized by their employer. This legal reasoning limits the contractual relation to the
time slot between the moment a driver opens the application and the moment he/she
switches it off. Thus, each time a driver switches off the application their contract is
terminated and it must be resumed once their Uber application is switched on. Such a
narrowed  definition of  the  work  status  overlooks  the  right  of  drivers  to  reject
assignments  while  their  applications  are  switched  on  without  being  penalized.
Moreover,  it  reinforces Uber’s disciplining practices against these drivers and helps
maintaining  the  company’s  surplus  of  drivers  which  is  being  used  to  undermine
drivers’ bargaining power and distort market prices.   
8 Furthermore, Uber is relieved from any obligation towards their employed ‘workers’
outside the working hours including the guarantee of  job continuity.  Similarly,  the
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verdict  does  not  specify  the  employers’  responsibility  for  occupational  safety  and
health  (OSH),  and  social  security.  Meanwhile,  the  judge  acknowledges  that  Uber
controls the overall labour process. 
9 As  ‘workers’,  the  adjudgment  reasoned  that  Uber  drivers  are  providing  a  ‘skilled
labour’ which is being used by Uber to deliver its transportation services and generate
profits  (para 92).  Hence,  such  reasoning  fails  at  capturing  a  key  mutation  of  work
relations as brought by Uber’s mode of production. The company’s appropriation of the
productive  force  of  drivers’  own  personal  assets  (a  car,  smartphone  and  internet
connection) is  a  prerequisite for their employability.  A driver is  not employable by
Uber unless he/she offers the company a free access into their own personal assets. In
this context, we recall the concept of labour power as elucidated by Karl Marx in ‘Das
Kapital’ (2013) which is limited to the workers’ set of physical and mental capabilities
that could be freely sold in the market. Accordingly, we believe that the labour power
purchased  by  Uber  encompasses  the  right  to  exploit  drivers’  personal  assets  and
transform it into a production input with the mediation of the company’s electronic
applications. The latter is becoming the instrument of labour used to create the surplus
value (cf. fig.2). In this process, Uber is granted the right to exploit the personal assets
of the drivers without any cost. We are leaning towards describing such process of as
the production of the surplus value by appropriating the productive force of workers’
personal assets. This is quite close to David Harvey’s (2004) approach on ‘accumulation
by dispossession’ however Uber is practicing this ‘dispossession’ on the individual level.
It does shift an important burden of capital investment to the burden of the drivers. As
result, the outcome is a company with a global fleet of one million cars (MKI, 2016,
p. 36)  available  for  ride  sharing  without  bearing  any  cost  on  investment  and
maintenance in any single car. It is clear for us that the judge’s reasoning on the ‘skilled
labour’ provided by drivers failed at acknowledging such a structural mutation. 
10 As the rule states in para 92 (points 1–13), the drivers lack control over various aspects
of  their  work  process  (market  information,  acceptance  of  trips,  routes,  tariffs,  the
evaluation process).  In  addition,  they,  we believe,  are  expelled from their  personal
properties (car/smartphone) during the labour process. This mirrors Marx’s notion of
work alienation (1988); as the power imbalance between the drivers and Uber alienates
the former not only from their own labour but also from their personal assets. This
explicitly  points  to  the  exploitive  foundation  of  Uber’s  model  and  the  need  to  go
beyond our conventional understanding of work relations to address it. 
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11 While acknowledging their entitlement to NMW, the court failed at classifying their
work within the limits of the three classifications (salaried hours’  work, time work,
output work) listed in the NMW regulations (2015) (paras 123–126).  Thus, the judge
reasoned  that  their  work  should  be  automatically  listed  as  ‘unmeasured  work’
(para 127). Here also, the verdict does not clarify if the ruled minimum wage reflects
the net remuneration for the skilled labour drivers or it is the gross income that should
include the cost of the uses of the workers’ own capital in the labour process. This
clearly  reflects  the  ‘relentless  interpretative’  (Sahni  I.,  2009,  p. 223)  role  of  the
judiciaries  and  their  limited  maneuvering  of  the  legal  approach  to  the  arising
conflicting social relations. 
12 The rule mentioned the power imbalance between the workers and Uber but failed at
fully  addressing  it;  this  reflects  the  constrained  nature  of  courts’  involvement  in
interpreting social transformation where the judge, in the Weberian understanding, is
a  mediator  who interprets  the  sanctioned legislation with  a  very  limited  ability  to
create new norms. Their enacted ‘legal wisdom’ is, largely confined by the ‘analogies’
they steer from ‘precedent’ rulings which represent a sort of binding ‘evidence’ (ibid,
p. 220, 224). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
13 The  employment  tribunal  adjudgment,  dated  on  October  28, 2016,  represents  a
breakthrough  in  the  struggle  of  workers  to  defy  and  overcome  the  bogus  of  self-
employment  as  adopted  and  imposed  by  Uber  and  other  companies  of  the  ‘gig-
economy’.  However,  the  courts’  reasoning  has  failed  at  transforming  its
acknowledgement of the power imbalance and dependent work relations into practical
protection and empowerment of the drivers. It is of foremost importance to underline
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that Uber’s mode of production is inducing a structural transformation in the process
of the extraction of the surplus value and the work relations. We do not believe that the
conventional  understanding  of  work  arrangements  can  capture  or  interpret  it.
Therefore, we question the ability of the judicialization process to elucidate such social
transformations where judges remain closely confined to ‘the discursive nature of the case
law, whereby words are tuned around and around interpreted and stretched with the aim of
adapting law to the varying needs’ (Weber, 1978). 
14 Drivers need to react in a manner that help them building their collective agency and
reestablish their  bargaining power as the main influencing arm over this  emerging
mode of capitalist production. We assume that shifting the social struggle to the hands
of the judiciary professionals and their instruments is an option with high risks and
very  limited  potential  gains.  These  gains,  if  achieved,  are  more  likely  to  be  at  the
expense  of  collective  options.  Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  additional  empirical
investigations are required to assess the impact of the litigation process of collective
action  in  the  context  of  work  relations  adopted  within  the  spectrum  of  the  ‘gig-
economy’. 
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NOTES
1.  The full  text  of  the verdict  could be accessed through the website  of  the UK Courts  and
Tribunals  Judiciary  system  by  using  the  following  link;  https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/
judgments/mr-y-aslam-mr-j-farrar-and-others-v-uber/, accessed April, 23rd 2017. 
2.  The  term  is  increasingly  being  used  to  describe  the  electronic  marketplaces  that  bring
together the demand and supply of labour, goods and services. Other terms are being used such
as the crowdsourcing, sharing economy, on-demand economy and more recently the platform
economy (Slee 2016, Donovan et al. 2016, Destephano 2016).
3.  The full text of the verdict could be accessed through the following link; accessed April, 23 rd
2017, http://www.clydeco.com/uploads/Blogs/employment/Dewhurst_and_CitySprint_1.pdf 
4.  Court of Justice of the European Union, “Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-434/15”, Press
release  No  50/17,  Luxembourg,  11  May  2017,  https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2017-05/cp170050en.pdf 
5.  All related documents and judicial decisions are accessible through the following link; http://
uberlawsuit.com/ 
6.  Electronic portal for the governmental services in the UK, the section on employment and
contracts, https://www.gov.uk/employment-status/worker (accessed, 2/14/2017). 
ABSTRACTS
This commentary provides a critical review of the verdict, issued in October 2016 by the London
employment tribunals, that classified Uber drivers as ‘workers’ entitled of the minimum wage. It
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argues that the ‘workers’ status, as reasoned by the court, mirrors the precarious work relations
and do not provide enough protection and empowerment for the drivers. Moreover, we critically
review the court’s ability to capture the social transformation brought about by companies such
as Uber.
Ce  commentaire  propose  une  analyse  critique  d’un jugement  rendu en octobre  2016  par  les
tribunaux d’emplois de Londres, en vertu duquel les chauffeurs d’Uber seraient des travailleurs
ayant droit au salaire minimum. Il soutient que le statut des travailleurs, tel qu’envisagé par la
cour, reflète les relations d’emplois précaires et ne confère pas suffisamment de protection et
d’autonomie aux chauffeurs. Par ailleurs, nous examinons de façon critique la capacité de la cour
à se saisir de la transformation sociale qu’amènent des entreprises comme Uber. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Uber, gig-économie, judiciarisation, travail atypique
Keywords: Uber, gig-economy, judicialization, informal work
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